The Rhetorical Toolbelt: An Overview of the Means of Persuasion

Introduction

In my introduction to this series, I began with Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as “the available means of persuasion”. For the Aristotelian study of rhetoric, these means of persuasion, or pisteis (πίστις), constitute the domains of rhetoric. Pistis, in the Greek sense, does not easily lend itself to an English counterpart. For our purposes, pistis refers to the appeal or affect toward a particular domain. The opening line of Aristotle’s Rhetoric begins by contrasting rhetoric as “the counterpart to dialectic.” Dialectic represents the philosophical tradition of argumentation to reach true, reasoned conclusions. As such, rhetoric is the process not of persuasion itself, but the processes by which we are persuaded. In his manual, Aristotle identifies three pisteis which belong to the domain of rhetoric which have come down to us as the “modes of persuasion”: Ethos (ἦθος), Pathos (πάθος), and Logos (λόγος). He also highlights a fourth pistis, Kairos (καιρός), which has been unceremoniously neglected by the rhetorical tradition.

Each of these pisteis relate to a particular domain of the rhetorical triangle (a contemporary tool used by compositional rhetoricians to demonstrate the principle of Aristotle’s teaching). To quote from Book I, Ch. 2 of Rhetoric, “Of the modes of persuasion (pisteis) furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind (ethos) depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second (pathos) on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third proof (logos), or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.” Kairos, then, is knowing when and how to implement the other three for maximum effect. As such, these pisteis compromise the toolbelt or toolbox within which our toolkit is kept.

It is additionally important to contextualize that Aristotle’s framework here is speechcraft. The world of Fourth Century Athens is not our multi-mediated world. To rely on a strict reading of Aristotle’s understanding will not adequately allow us to explore and discover the best uses of these pisteis in a contemporary world. We can, however, use speechmaking as a metaphor to see how rhetoric works within the broader persuasive realm. By analogizing the “pisteis furnished by the spoken word” with oratory, we can more easily categorize rhetorical theory in a digestible way. Therefore, I will use the term “speaker” as a terministic shortcut to discuss ethos, "audience" to refer to pathos, and "speech" for logos. This framework will be especially useful when we arrive at the dramatistic theory of Kenneth Burke, but for now these terms will suffice. From here, the rest of the essay will be devoted to a short overview of the three “appeals” to persuasion and their relationship to each other.

Ethos: The Appeal to the Character of the Speaker

From the Greek for “character”, the domain of ethos relates to the effect of the quality of the speaker. For Aristotle, this happens within the speech itself and was not something brought in by the audience. As a rhetorical appeal, ethos is the means by which a speaker establishes their credibility or integrity both on the nature of the particular topic and as an individual. Aristotle asserts three aspects which point to the ethos of a speaker: Common sense (phronesis), virtue (arête), and goodwill (eunoia). He writes, “It follows that one who is thought to have all three of these qualities will inspire trust in his audience.”

By common sense, Aristotle means practical knowledge which benefits the individual by achieving happiness. Much of Book I of Rhetoric is a discussion of happiness, which can also be found in Book 6 of his Ethics. Happiness is defined as “prosperity combined with virtue; or an independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property and making use of them.” More simply, we can say this is the practicability of what the speaker has to provide for the audience.

Virtue, then, is the moral quality of the speaker. In a modern sense, this has been reduced to the trope of “virtue signaling” (a pessimistic critique I will tackle in a later essay on ethos more broadly). As speakers, we can strengthen our case by tethering ourselves to social ideals which have deep cultural value. Richard Weaver best describes the use of arête in his Ethics of Rhetoric with the discussion of Ultimate Terms, terministic shortcuts which provide single word utterances to bolster the integrity of the speaker through appeals to positive or negative virtues. For example, one can establish themselves as a just individual by associating their own qualities or actions with our socially held notions of what it means to be just.

Finally, goodwill demonstrates the speaker’s intent toward the audience. This is usually translated as “friendship” or the qualities of comradery, gentility, or companionship. More broadly, it can be said to cover how the speaker seeks to help achieve happiness in the audience. By demonstrating a desire to not harm, but in fact aid, the audience, the speaker’s ethos is strengthened and the appeal made more persuasive.

Beyond the Aristotelian notion, ethos appeals can apply to the character of the sources supporting the arguments (logos) within the speech, as well. If I am discussing a medical procedure, but am not a doctor (a typical assumption as rhetoricians are specialists in persuasion itself, not particular topics), I can establish a phronetic connection of practicality (in medicine’s utility) and appeal to the socially held value (arête) of doctors as goodwill (eunoia) practitioners of medicine. These go beyond simply being knowledgeable, which is demonstrated by logos appeals, but in being a person characteristic of the knowledge domain being discussed. While much of these ethos associations will be held by the audience a priori (before the persuasive appeal) a successful appeal to credibility must establish with certainty why the source is credible.

Pathos: The Appeal to the Emotions of the Audience

Pathos is arguably one of the most maligned of the pisteis due to its association with irrationality. More accurately, pathos can be viewed as placing the audience into a particular emotional framework which induces them to be more susceptible to the speaker’s arguments (logos). If this sounds manipulative at first, then redirect your attention to the discussion on ethos above. If the speaker has established theirself as a person of practicable, virtuous goodwill, then the audience is more likely to willingly comply with emotive appeals. While Aristotle outlines eleven different emotions which constitute the bulk of Book II, of more use to our discussion are his four causes (aitia).

Aristotle uses the emotion of anger as an example, “…here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in anyone.” Here, we see the material cause as the audience’s emotive state of being, the formal cause as the persons or objects to which they express the emotion, the efficient cause as the motivations for the emotion, and the final cause as the knowledge of all of these to fully understand the quality of the emotion’s affect over the audience.

Emotions, despite the rationalist bias which maligns “feelings” and equates them with hysteria, are not the unreasonable bogeymen for which they are typically mischaracterized. This is a biologically unsound assumption which I will again discuss more fully in later essays dedicated to pathos. However, a brief overview can be begun here. Emotions have to do with the cognitive responses of conscious organisms. They are responses to external stimuli which evolved for a variety of specialized utilities. Fear, for example, is a mental state that relates to threat. If an animal encounters a predator, it benefits that animal for its brain to place it in a state of fear to motivate it to flee. What the speaker does is simulate or highlight (the intent of speakers will again be addressed in future work) the appropriate emotional response for the situation relevant to the topic being discussed. Returning again to ethos, a credible speaker will utilize emotional appeals accordingly. If the speaker has not properly presented an adequate sense of their character, appeals to the emotional state of the audience are more than likely to backfire.

Logos: The Appeal to Reasons

Logos is the most substantially discussed and examined pistis in Rhetoric. Beginning with his assertion that enthymemes “are the substance of rhetorical persuasion”, logos is the domain of the speech itself (or more accurately the arguments and their placement). Walter Fisher, in his masterwork Human Communication As Narration, opens with one of the most succinct descriptions of what logos, in the Grecian sense, entails, “In the beginning was the word or, more accurately, the logos. And in the beginning logos meant story, reason, rationale, conception, discourse, thought. Thus, all forms of human communication—from epic to architecture, from biblical narrative to statuary—came within its purview.”

Aristotle breaks logos into two categories: Example and enthymeme. Enthymeme is a simplified logical syllogism (logic being a derivative of logos). However, there is a great deal of misinformation on logical appeals, which highlight the abuse of what Fisher calls “the rational-world paradigm”. To quote Fisher at length,

“The rational-world paradigm presupposes: (1) humans are essentially rational beings; (2) the paradigmatic mode of human decision making and communications is argument—discourse that features clear-cut inferential or implicative structures; (3) the conduct of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations—legal, scientific, legislative, public, and so on; (4) rationality is determined by subject-matter knowledge, argumentative ability, and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields; and (5) the world is a set of logical puzzles that can be solved through appropriate analysis and application of reason conceived as an argumentative construct.”

While the bulk of Aristotle’s discussion of logos uses this framework, in Book II, Ch. 20, his discussion of example provides a brief moment of discussion to narrative reasons, both fictive and non-fictive. This is, yet again, a discussion for later essays, but it is important to note this conflict now. When I discuss logos appeals, it should not be inferred that we are discussing truth or logic. Just as ethos is an appeal not to the inherent ethic or character of the speaker, but the appearance of character, and pathos appeals to the appearance of an emotive stimulus-response evoked in the audience, logos is concerned with appealing to the appearance of good reasons. It is through dialectic (or philosophy) where the “truth” of these appeals is to be judged.

As such, reasons constitute the evidentiary structure of the speech itself. Rhetorically, a reasoned appeal to an historical example is just as viable as a fictive one. Additionally, these arguments are structured through enthymeme, which produce soundness in our reasoning. To conclude, Aristotle makes two important qualifiers as to the veracity of logos appeals.

Firstly,

“The first thing to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak or argue. Otherwise, we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments.”

Secondly,

“Educated men lay down broad general principles; uneducated men argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions. We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined—those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority we recognize…”

What these two statements infer is firstly, the aim of logos is to speak knowledgeably. This is not only a validation of ethos, but essential for logos appeals to persuade. Secondly, logos appeals should be catered to the audience. A knowledgeable audience is more likely to be persuaded by enthymeme (logic) because they will be able to follow and evaluate the speaker's conclusions. However, general audiences are much more inclined to be persuaded through example (or narratively constructed arguments). This tension within logos will be explored to much greater depth in future essays, but for now it will suit us to leave the discussion here. What is important to understand is that reasons should not be conflated with Reason.

Conclusion

Thus concludes our brief overview of the pisteis, or means, of persuasion. As a summary, I want to briefly go over kairos, or the timing of the appeals. It is important to note that it is not intended to rely on only one or two of these pisteis. All three work together and are implemented in their own due time. Logos, of course, should constitute the bulk of a speaker's appeals. It constitutes the meat (to use the old compositional metaphor) of rhetoric. Ethos is best set out in the beginning, for you must establish why you are to be believed and with what intent you seek to persuade. Pathos appeals should be lightly sprinkled throughout the process, but are strongest initially (to put your audience in the appropriate frame of mind) and at the end (to leave them so properly induced). Knowing when and for how long an individual appeal should be made is something that can only be achieved through practice and an understanding of rhetoric.

Before we continue further into the rhetorical field, my next several essays in this series will delve deeper into explorations of the pisteis, bringing in broader scholarship beyond Aristotle and the Athenian tradition. If we are to become skilled philosophers, it is imperative that we have a well-constructed toolbelt to hold our tools. Poor rhetoric makes for poor dialectic, which produces poor philosophy.